Introducing the carriers
There are only four countries operating conventional aircraft carriers:
Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia
Built in the 1980s at the height of Soviet military power this carrier was designed more as an aircraft-carrying cruiser, as a bigger and better accompaniment to the Kirov ‘battlecruisers’. Like the Kirov, the primary role was surface warfare against the USN carrier battle groups, with the massive 12 P-700 ‘Granit’ (NATO “Shipwreck”) supersonic anti-ship missiles. These have a stated range of 625km and packed a 750kg warhead (or 500kt tactical-nuclear); they are very real carrier sinking missiles.
But, and this is a big but, the emphasis on carrying long range anti-ship missiles comes at the cost of the carrier’s other role; aircraft. The main jets carried are Su-33 Flankers, a naval version of the Su-27. These are air-combat fighters with only very rudimentary air-ground capability. Their role is fleet defense, not power projection.
Nimitz, USA
The Nimitz class nuclear carrier is the carrier by which all are measured. And US Navy has 11 ‘super carriers’ which is 10 more large carriers than anyone else. Not all are Nimitz class but I’m going to use Nimitz as the “typical” US carrier for this comparison.
NAe Sao Paulo, Brazil
The forgotten large carrier, Brazil’s Sao Paulo was formerly France’s Foch. The 32,0800 ton carrier acts mainly as a training ship to get the Brazilian navy into the mould of operating combat jets from carriers.
Charles De Gaulle, France
A nuclear powered carrier designed to replace the Clemenceau class, this class is noteworthy in that it has a nuclear deterrent role with ASMP tactical nuclear missiles carried by its Super Etendard fighters. The design gets a lot of criticism but all-in-all it is a very potent adversary should you face the Frogs.
The Comparisons!!!!
Air wing bias and force mix
I’ve no real interest in pissing contests between the Flanker and Super-Hornet etc. But I am curious as to how the force mix of say air-combat fighters and ASW aircraft illustrate doctrinal differences between navies. Of course legacy procurement plans, budgets and systems availability are all also factors; but nonetheless navies have made certain choices to invest in certain capabilities to the determent to others. For example, whether to carry X combat jets or Y combat jets and Z anti-submarine aircraft.
Typical air wings (not maximum!!!!)
As you can see the Nimitz carries by far the most aircraft. It’s important to note that none of the air-wings depicted represent the maximum capacity of the carrier. Simply put, large aircraft carriers are capable of accommodating and operating far more aircraft than is militarily necessary:
Obviously the lack of strike-capable aircraft on the Admiral Kuznetsov is out of choice not capability, reflecting a completely different naval doctrine than the Americans. It is well within Russia’s means to upgrade the Su-33s to a similar standard to the Su-27SM, able to carry anti-ship, anti-radar and precision strike weapons and also enhance the air-air capability. A more likely event is for new-build Su-33s to enter service with a true multi-role capability. This is actually likely to happen in the next few years as the production line for the Su-33s will reopen following an order from China which will reduce costs for a piggy-back domestic order. At any rate if Russia does build more carriers (as they claim) then they’ll need more Su-33s or an alternative. Sukhoi did develop a naval strike version of the Su-33 dubbed the Su-27KUB with a side-by-side seating arrangement similar to the Su-32 Fullback. This aircraft was described as a trainer but the interdiction suitability is obvious, although range and weapons load would be inhibited by the STOBAR (Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery) configuration.
Another factor is that the Kuznetsov could easily handle another squadron of Su-33s.
One curiosity is that I think it makes sense to illustrate the Kuznetsov’s ‘Granit’ missiles alongside the air wing for context. In the USSR naval doctrine the Kuznetsov was essentially just a cruiser capable of providing air defense and ASW aircraft to support a fleet centered around destroying NATO surface and submarine fleets. It was not intended for “power projection” as the Nimitz’s multirole air-wing shows. The ‘Granit’ missiles were almost the size of a jet fighter and more than capable of sinking any aircraft carrier, and half their support vessels at the same time, even with a near miss thanks to a 500kt tactical nuclear warhead. It’s not clear whether the nuke was air-burst, in which case conventional CIWS would have been pointless, or impact fused like ordinary anti-ship missiles. Also, many of the ‘Granit’s carried conventional warheads of 750kg in lieu of the nuke, enough to sink most ships including potentially a carrier depending on the circumstances of impact. For context that’s more than triple the bang of a Harpoon. In the case of the 500kt nuke, that’s over 2 million times a Harpoon’s bang(!!!!).
Whilst Granit certainly wins on sheer power, its range sounds more impressive than it is. 625km is certainly a lot for a missile, but not that much compared to an aircraft. Therefore air-launched missiles allow the carrier to be further away from the target to launch an attack. The following very simplistic illustration shows relative distances for the Russian, US and French carriers respectively.
Note that I used this website to calculate the radar horizons, assuming a target height of 30m.
The Kuznetsov can launch from 625km away but needs a means of targeting the enemy. Because the radar horizon of the Kuznetsov is only about 52km, this must be done by other units. Targeting can be done by warships closer, intelligence sources, or aircraft. In the latter case a Tu-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft is an obvious candidate. The range at which a Bear can detect a surface target will vary depending on its altitude (the globe is round!). Giving the Bear the benefit of the doubt this might be as far as 675km, although in a heavy electronic warfare environment this would be much shorter. Either way 675km is still well within the intercept range of US or French carrier fighters.
It seems probable that a Granit could be shot down by the US’s AEGIS system using Standard SM-2ER or SM-2MR missiles. And even if the missile penetrated closer in it has to get through the ESSM and RAM barriers. I’d suggest that the Phalanx CIWS would be small comfort against a Granit. To maximize the chances of getting through multiple Granits would be used, hunting like a pack. It’s claimed that the Granit can network together so that only one missile needs to pop-up for radar searches, thus reducing the detectability of the others in the pack. However, let’s not forget that a near-miss with a 500kt nuclear weapon might not be enough.
The regular shipboard anti-submarine helicopter of the Russian navy, the Ka-27 Helix, can be used for targeting. Although Kuznetsov carries 18 of these, they are too short ranged to target the Granit at its maximum range, and their own radars is likely to be quite weak meaning that the Helix probably has to penetrate the AEGIS screen to detect the carrier! Brave pilots!
The USN’s air-launched Harpoon missile gives the Nimitz extra reach, which is also true of the French AM-39 Exocet. The Exocet is an older missile, arguably the first of the modern breed of sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, but suffers from relatively short range due to its rocket motor. Coupled with the older and weaker radar on the Super-Etendard aircraft this leaves the launch aircraft extremely vulnerable to interception by aircraft or missiles because it needs to get relatively close to the target vessel. The Rafale can also carry the Exocet which will certainly be a more survivable proposition against a modern adversary, but for the moment the Rafale is primarily used for air defense.
Another curiosity is that as whilst the Russian’s have neglected strike aircraft, they embark a massive fleet of anti-submarine aircraft; 18 vs 6 on the Nimitz. These helicopters are relatively short ranged (about 200km combat radius) but drastically increase the survivability of the carrier when faced with its true nemesis; the nuclear powered attack sub. In fact, Russia like France and US regularly deploys attack subs as the first line of defense of the carrier group.
(excludes Granit.)
Look at typical air-defence loads:
Although the Flanker has a brilliant reputation, the Su-33 version operated from the Kuznetsov is a 1980s variant and the weapons have not been heavily modernized. Although it can carry the R-27 family of missiles including the extremely long ranged R-27EM missile which is claimed to be able to intercept cruise missiles at wave-top height, it does not carry the more modern active-radar guided R-77 “Adder” missile. Another shortcoming is that because it is operating off a ski-jump it cannot take-off with a full weapons load or fuel load, although if it used the rear-most take-off position for maximum run-up it can probably carry more than many observers credit. However, what this means is that despite the Flanker’s impressive range and 12 hardpoints, it is likely to be operating on a relatively short combat radius (translates to shorter combat-air-patrols(CAP)) and with fewer missiles.
The F-18E/F (technically “F/A” but I hate that) Super-Hornet however is fresh out of the factory and can carry the potent AMRAAM active-radar missiles and the AIM-9X dogfighting missile which at least compares to the R-73 carried by the Flanker. I’ll be honest, the Super-hornet is a boring design. But it can carry double-rail AMRAAMs (conceptually up to 14; 6 under each wing and two on the fuselage!) and is now deploying with an Active Electronically Surveyed Array (AESA) radar.
However, only approximately half the F-18s on the carriers are “Supers”, the rest are still the older and less potent F/A-18C/D version. Even these can carry AMRAAM for air-defence though. Of course the Super-Hornet’s main role isn’t air defence, it’s a strike platform. Perhaps as China and Russia become more adventurous in their naval exercises this profile might change.
The Rafale carries the French MICA series of missile which are very potent but shorter ranged than the AMRAAM. Rafale has yet to receive AESA but is nonetheless as 4.5 generation fighter. The Rafales are multi-role aircraft and will also carry SCALP cruise missiles, Exocet anti-ship missiles and smart bombs. However, with the cheaper to operate Super-Etendards still on board the French navy has not been in any great hurry to train or realise this capability. This will change in the next few years as the Super-Etendards come to the end of their useful life. Certainly the Rafale is comparable to the F-18E in every respect.
The Brazilian’s conduct air defence with the Skyhawk using AIM-9 Sidewinders. Lacking an intercept radar, and without AEW support, this combination is inadequate at best. The main role of the AF-1 (A-4KU) Skyhawk is “training” a future carrier capability but with no purchase of a replacement carrier fighter in sight (Rafale, MiG-29k Fulcrums or surplus F/A-18Cs would be feasible) the obsolete Skyhawks look set to soldier on. I’ve previously listed the Skyhawks as ground attack aircraft because their air-defence capability really is that poor, but even in strike they only carry dumb bombs and rockets.
Air wings: Conclusion
Overall, the US carriers with their Super-Hornets/Hornets have a clear advantage, both in technology and numbers. Rafale is an excellent aircraft but France is holding back on fully utilizing its capabilities. A modernization of the Su-33 could certainly close the gap but for now the Russian carrier air-wing is a bit dated, and small. If Russia increased the Flankers carried they soon run out of airframes. Brazil is impotent.
Organic Air-defence excl. aircraft
The primary form of air-defence for a carrier are its combat jets. Next would be the area-air-defence SAMs of specialized air-defence escorts. But because the ships are so valuable, and such likely targets, they need close-in anti-missile defenses of their own.
This is the aspect where Kuznetsov is the clear winner.
The obvious loser is the Sao Paulo with zero air-defences. It’s surprising that Brazil hasn’t sought to fit even the cheapest and most basic AAA.
We could stop there but let’s go on. Just looking at Close-in-weapons-systems the Kuznetsov has 14 whilst the other two carriers have just 2 apiece:
A comparison of engagement zones of shipboard guns/missiles:
And a visualization of the relative numbers of missiles carried:
Air defences: Conclusion
So the short answer is that Kuznetsov has by far the most vast armory of air-defences, but that Charles De Gaulle has the furthest reaching and most sophisticated (the Aster-15 is active radar guided!).
And now that we have decided that Kuznetsov is by far the most heavily defended, let’s get some context. This is a scale illustration of the relative air-defence zones of the SAMs of the carriers and their typical escorts. The US carriers have by far the most and most-capable escorts although France and Russia can claim some credibility with small numbers of excellent air-defence warships of their own. The French Horizon class is only now entering service and carriers a longer ranged version of the incredible Aster missile. The Russian escorts shown have older versions of the S-300 “Grumble” SAM but one of the Kirovs carries a much longer ranged version.
Once again the Sao Paulo is left very vulnerable to air-attack with no credible area-air-defence escorts.
Deck layout and flight operations efficiency
Obviously the efficiency with which a ship operates is largely down to crew training, experience, equipment and similar aspects. However the underlying design and layout of the flightdeck has a huge impact also.
In general terms the bigger a flight deck is the easier it is to operate a given number of aircraft. Having said that, all of the carriers compared will rarely if ever carry a full air wing, either because it’s deemed unnecessary (US/France) or because there simply aren’t enough of the right planes in the navy (Russia, Brazil).
Another basic truth is that the number, size and position of the deck lifts (to move aircraft between the hanger and the deck) is important. More and bigger is better, and placed on the edges of the flight deck. Deck-centre lifts do have some advantages but nearly everyone agrees that their negative impact on flight deck movement is far worse. This is worst for Sao Paulo which only has two smallish lifts with one placed to obstruct the take-off handling. At the other end of the spectrum Nimitz has four huge lifts, one per aircraft launch position.
In terms of launch positions there is a huge debate about the relative merits of steam catapults and ski-jump ramps. Steam catapults allow heavier laden aircraft to take off, but at the cost of installation weight and complexity. Ski jumps reduce parking space on deck because you can’t park a jet on one.
It is often claimed that they also prevent large fixed wing aircraft like transports and AEW or ASW aircraft from operating. This isn’t proven and Russia did intend to use STOL AEW aircraft like the An-71 Madcap :
The Ukrainian built Madcap was dropped in favour of the yak-44 but the fall of the USSR put paid to the costly project. There was also an improved version of the Antanov An-71 design which had an ordinary tail and phased array radars along the fuselage. Yak-44:
The Yak-44 was much like a Hawkeye.
A less talked about deck space problem is missile launchers getting in the way. Two of the designs, Admiral Kuznetsov and Charles De Gaulle both have VLS on the deck! In the former’s case it is anti-ship missiles and in the latter’s SAMs.
A factor in deck utilization and efficiency, is the size of the aircraft being handled. This is even more impactful down in the confines of the hanger. At first glance the massive Su-33 is much bigger than any of the other aircraft, save the AEW/Transport aircraft like Hawkeye. But, naval architects get around this by making the aircraft fold up smaller. In the case of the Su-33, the wingspan is an incredible 49% narrower when folded. Although the Su-33 remains longer, it is actually narrower than the much lighter F-18E/F Super-hornet!
At the other end of the spectrum the A-4 (AF-1) Skyhawk is so small it doesn’t need to fold up. But it’s still wider than the Su-33(!). Although, overall the A-4 remains the smallest deck space. And length is also a premium, especially when parked on the deck. The deck layout of the Kuznetsov, with its ski-jump, doesn’t allow parking on the bow anyway, but in general aircraft are parked with their tail over the side so the shorter the aircraft, the less a row of parked ones impedes flight operations.
Deck layout: Conclusion
The largest and most versatile deck is undoubtedly the Nimitz’s.
Conclusion
Overall the USN’s Nimitz class carrier wins hands down, but not across the board. It’s weapons systems and sensors are inferior to the Kuznetsov and Charles De Gaulle but this is mitigated by the abundance and excellence of its escorts ; i.e. the others have a greater emphasis on sensors and defensive aids because they need them more. The obvious loser though is Sao Paulo; so much potential, such an inadequate fit and no worthwhile air-defence escorts.
